Abstract: What do the education premiums look like over the life cycle? What is the impact of schooling on lifetime earnings? How does the internal rate of return compare with opportunity cost of funds? To what extent does progressive taxes attenuate the incentives to invest in education? This paper exploits Norwegian population panel data with nearly career long earnings histories to answer these important questions. We provide a detailed picture of the causal relationship between schooling and earnings over the life cycle, following individuals across their working lifespan. To account for endogeneity of schooling, we apply three commonly used identification strategies. Our estimates show that additional schooling gives higher lifetime earnings and steeper age-earnings profile, in line with predictions from human capital theory. These estimates imply an internal rate of return of around 10 percent, after taking into account income taxes and earnings-related pension entitlements. Under standard conditions, this finding suggests it was financially profitable to take additional schooling because the rate of return is substantially higher than the market interest rates typically observed. By comparison, we find that the Mincer model substantially understates the rates of return, because of nonstationarity and misspecification of the earnings-schooling-experience relationship.
Introduction
Many empirical papers use cross-section data to estimate a Mincer regression of the following type:
where y is log earnings, S is years of schooling, X is (potential) experience and is the error term.
1 The problem of selection bias can be addressed by controlling for correlated determinants of earnings or with an instrumental variable for schooling. However, it is not clear how the coefficient on schooling should be interpreted. One possibility is to view the Mincer model as a pricing equation for labor market characteristics and interpret µ 1 as the growth rate of earnings with schooling (education premium). A more ambitious interpretation is that µ 1 gives the discount rate which equates the present value of potential income streams for different schooling levels. This internal rate of return (IRR) is a fundamental economic parameter that is often used to assess private profitability of additional schooling or whether expenditure on education should be increased or decreased. A number of strong assumptions must hold in order to interpret µ 1 as the IRR (see e.g. Heckman et al., 2006 Heckman et al., , 2008 . While many of these assumptions turn out to hold in the data that Mincer (1974) analyzed, they are now at odds with a large body of evidence (Heckman et al., 2006) . Even interpretating µ 1 as an education premium requires assumptions that no longer receive support in data. In particular, several studies show that wage patterns have changed dramatically across cohorts (see e.g. MaCurdy and Mroz, 1995; Card and Lemieux, 2001) . As a result, cross-sections no longer approximate the life cycle earnings or schooling returns of any particular individual (Heckman et al., 2006) . The use of data that follows actual cohorts over the life cycle is therefore essential to accurately measure their true earnings pattern and estimate the education premiums experienced by individuals.
Our objective is to provide a detailed picture of the causal relationship between schooling and earnings over the life cycle, following individuals over their working lifespan. There are a number of key questions addressed. What do the education premiums look like over the life cycle? What is the impact of schooling on lifetime earnings? How does the IRR compare with the market interest rates typically observed? To what extent does progressive taxes attenuate the incentives to invest in education? To investigate these important questions, we exploit a unique source of population panel data containing records for every Norwegian from 1967 to 2010. Our analysis focuses on males. To account for endogeneity of schooling, we apply three identification strategies that are currently in use in the literature: Compulsory schooling reform as an instrument for education; controls for ability test scores: and within-twin-pair estimation. Our analysis is explicitly ex post, focusing on the actual returns earned by certain cohorts.
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We begin by estimating education premiums at each age. We find that additional schooling gives higher lifetime earnings and steeper age-earnings profile, in line with predictions from human capital theory. The age-specific education premiums imply an IRR of around 10 percent, after taking into account income taxes and earnings-related pension entitlements. Under standard conditions, this finding suggests it was financially profitable to take additional schooling because the rate of return is substantially higher than the market interest rates typically observed. By comparison, we find that the Mincer model substantially understates the IRR, because of nonstationarity and misspecification of the earnings-schooling-experience relationship.
Our analysis relaxes many of the strong assumptions that are typical in the literature.
3 Importantly, we can estimate education premiums experienced by individuals over their life cycle and the corresponding rates of return, without assuming multiplicative separability between schooling and experience or a stationarity environment. The size and detailed nature of the data we are using allow us to explore nonlinearities in the earnings-schooling relationship. Unlike most of the literature, our estimated rates of return take into account income taxation and earnings-related pension entitlements. While there is virtually no pecuniary cost of schooling (such as tuition or fees) in Norway, we abstract from any psychic costs of education. Psychic costs could help explaining why not more individuals take additional schooling despite its high estimated financial return (see e.g. Carneiro et al., 2003; Cunha et al., 2005) . Alternative explanations include credit market constraints (see e.g. Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Belley and Lochner, 2007) or uncertainy about future earnings gains from additional schooling (see e.g. Cunha et al., 2005; Heckman et al., 2006) . This paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 descibes our data, presents the identifi-2 In studies that aim to explain or forecast schooling choices, the distinction between ex ante and ex post returns to schooling is important (see e.g. Cunha et al., 2005; Heckman et al., 2006; Cunha and Heckman, 2007) . Ex post returns govern schooling decisions only if cohorts anticipate future changes in skill prices.
3 Heckman et al. (2006 Heckman et al. ( , 2008 examine how allowing for taxes, tuition and a flexible relationship between earnings, schooling, and experience affects estimated IRRs. However, these studies assume that schooling is exogenous and also require a method for extrapolating the earnings function to work experience levels not observed in the data.
cation strategies and reports summary statistics. Section 3 presents the estimated education premiums and corresponding rates of returns. Section 4 contrasts our results with estimates from alternative approaches, including the Mincer model. Section 5 concludes.
Data and empirical strategy

Data and sample selection
Our empirical analysis utilizes several registry databases maintained by Statistics Norway. This allows us to construct a rich longitudinal data set containing records for every Norwegian from 1967 to 2010. The variables captured in this data set include individual demographic information (including sex and age), socio-economic data (such as years of schooling and annual earnings) and ability test scores from millitary records. The data set includes personal identifiers, allowing us to link children to their parents and siblings. We can also merge the longitudinal data set with census data from 1960. This allows us to measure family background variables, including childhood municipality of residence.
We consider three measures of income. In each year, our measure of (pretax) earnings is the sum of labor income (from wages and self-employment) and workrelated cash transfers (such as unemployment benefits and short-term sickness benefits). To take income taxation into account, we use detailed information on the Norwegian tax system for the period . In each year, we measure after-tax income by subtracting taxes (on labor income and work-related cash transfers) from earnings. We also consider a measure of income which takes earnings-related pension entitlements into account. All Norwegians are entitled to public pension upon retirement (in accordance with the Norwegian National Insurance Act). The pension amount depends on an individual's earnings history from age 16 to retirement. For every income variable, we measure income at a given age as the annual real income in the corresponding year, adjusted for inflation.
4 Detailed description of the income variables used in the empirical analysis is provided in Appendix Table A. 1. The Norwegian earnings data have several advantages over those available in most other countries. First, there is no attrition from the original sample because of the need to ask permission from individuals to access their tax records. In Norway, these records are in the public domain. Second, our earnings data pertain to all individuals, and not only to jobs covered by social security. Third, we have nearly career-long earnings histories for certain cohorts. And fourth, top-coding is only performed at very high earnings levels. In fact, less than 3 percent of the observations have right-censored earnings in any given year.
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Our regressor of interest is the number of years of schooling. To ensure that virtually everyone has completed their education, we will measure schooling at age 40 throughout this paper. Educational attainment is reported by the educational establishment directly to Statistics Norway, thereby minimizing any measurement error due to misreporting.
In the main analysis, we focus on the 1943-1963 cohorts in order to ensure long earnings histories for all individuals. Our analytical sample is restricted to males because of low labor market participation rates for women in the early periods. We exclude immigrants as well as individuals with missing information on years of schooling and childhood municipality of residence. Applying these restrictions provides us with what we will refer to as the full sample, consisting of 600,679 individuals (see the Appendix, Table A .2).
Education premiums and rates of return
We aim to provide a detailed picture of the relationship between schooling and earnings over the life cycle, following individuals across their working lifespan. In the main analysis, we define the potential working lifespan from ages 17 to 62.
6 Consider, for now, the simple earnings regression:
where Y t is the annual real earnings at age t = 17, ...., 62, S is years of schooling, β t is the education premium at age t (which may vary among persons) and ε t is the residual. Equipped with education premiums at every age, we can assess how additional schooling affects earnings over the life cycle and compute the mean education premium in lifetime earnings,
The IRR is the discount rate that equates the present value of potential income 5 We have also estimated the returns to schooling using a Pareto distribution to simulate earnings above the top-coded threshold. These estimates are very similar to the baseline results and available from the authors upon request.
6 Although the mandatory retirement age is 67, about 80 % of Norwegian workers are entitled to receive early retirement benefits beginning at age 62 (Hernaes et al., 2013) . streams for different schooling levels. The IRR can be defined as the solution to the following equation:
Under standard conditions, the IRR can be compared to the opportunity cost of funds to determine if it was financially profitable to take additional schooling. The opportunity cost is often proxied by the market interest rate (r ). The profitability of investing in education can then be quantified by computing the education premium in the annuity of lifetime earnings,
where α = r 1−(1+r) −(62−16) . To calculate annuity values, we discount the earnings streams by a real interest rate of 2.3 percent, which corresponds to the average real interest rate on deposits and loans in Norway over the period 1967 (Aaberge et al., 2011 . Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between life cycle earnings, education premiums and IRR. This figure plots the earnings-age profiles for college and high-school educated Norwegian men born in the years . For simplicity, suppose schooling is exogenous and the education premiums are homogenous across individuals. Both earnings profiles display the familiar concave shape documented and analyzed by Mincer (1974) , but the college-educated workers experience more rapid earnings growth through most of the life cycle. The college premium at a particular age (β t ) is given by the vertical distance between the earnings profiles. The horizontal lines depict the mean lifetime real earnings for college and high school educated. The college premium in mean lifetime earnings (β) is given by the vertical distance between the two horizontal lines. The discount rates that equates the two earnings streams depends on the extent to which college education gives higher lifetime earnings and steeper age-earnings profile. In particular, the IRR increases inβ, holding the slope of β t fixed; and it reduces in the slope of β t , keepingβ fixed. For simplicity, we described here the method for determining the IRR with no income taxation or earnings-related pension entitlements and linearity in the earningsschooling relationship. In the empirical analysis, we explore how the estimates are affected by relaxing these assumptions. 
Identification strategies
In the absence of experimental evidence, it is difficult to know whether the higher earnings observed among highly educated workers are caused by their additional schooling, or whether individuals with greater earnings capacity have chosen to acquire more schooling. To address this concern of selection bias in earnings regressions, a number of identification strategies have been proposed and scrutinized. In this paper, we apply three different identification strategies that are currently in use in the literature.
Instrumental variables approach Our first identification strategy is an instrumental variables (IV) approach that follows Black et al. (2005) in using the staged implementation of a Norwegian compulsory schooling law reform as a source of exogenous variation in schooling.
Other studies that have used this reform include Monstad et al. (2008) , Aakvik et al. (2010) , and Machin et al. (2012) . For evidence on how compulsory schooling laws have affected earnings in other countries, see e.g. Angrist and Krueger (1991) , Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) , and Oreopolous (2006) for the United States, Harmon and Walker (1995) , Oreopolous (2006) , Devereux and Hart (2010) , and Devereux and Fan (2011) for the United Kingdom, Meghir and Palme (2005) for Sweden, The reform increased compulsory schooling from seven to nine years, and was implemented between 1959 and 1974 in different municipalities (the lowest level of local administration) at different times. Thus, for more than a decade, Norwegian schools were divided into two separate systems, where the years of compulsory schooling depended on the year in which an individual was born and the municipality of residence. A detailed description of the school reform is provided in the Appendix, Section A.3.
We are able to successfully identify the year in which the reform was implemented for as many as 672 out of the 732 municipalities. Individuals who were residing in a municipality to which we could not assign a reform indicator are dropped from our sample. Applying this sample restriction we get an IV sample consisting of 576,704 individuals who were born during the period 1943-1963, covering nearly 96 percent of the full sample (see the Appendix, Table A.3).
The IV model is given by the following two-equation system, where (7) is the first stage and (6) is the second stage:
where Z is the compulsory schooling reform dummy, equal to 1 if the individual was exposed to the reformed schooling law and 0 otherwise, subscript m denotes municipality and subscript c denotes birth cohort. Unobservable determinants of earnings or schooling that are fixed at the municipality level will be controlled for through the childhood municipality indicators (µ m , θ m ), just like the birth cohort indicators (µ c , θ m ) absorb changes in cohort quality or aggregate changes in skill prices. Throughout the paper, standard errors are always clustered at the municipality level and robust to heteroskedasticity. Figure 2 provides a visual representation of our IV approach, after taking out municipality and cohort effects. For each municipality, time zero represents the first birth cohort affected by the compulsory schooling law reform. The y-axis on the right side of the graph shows that the change in compulsory schooling law from time -1 to time 0 is associated with a substantial increase in educational attainment. The y-axis on the left side of the graph shows that the change in compulsory schooling law from time -1 to time 0 is associated with a substantial increase in lifetime earnings. Taken together, these changes suggest a strong IV estimate on lifetime earnings of the reform-induced increase in schooling.
8 In Section 3.4, we challenge the validity of the and also Oreopolous (2006) for Canada and Northern Ireland. 8 Estimation results for the first stage in equation (7) show that the first stage is strong and instrument by probing the stability of the IV estimates to alternative specifications, finding little cause for worry. Alternative approaches The IV model identifies the education premiums among persons obliged to stay in school longer because of compulsory school laws. Because of the local nature of these estimates, we will also apply two alternative identification strategies that are currently in use in the literature.
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Rather than using an instrument, our second strategy attempts to control directly for differences in ability when estimating equation (6). To this end, we use information on ability test scores from Norwegian military records. In Norway, military service is compulsory for all able males. Before entering the service, their medical and precisely estimated at 0.213 (see Section 3.4, Table 5, Panel B). This means that exposure to the compulsory schooling reform increased years of schooling by about one-fifth of a year among Norwegian male cohorts 1943-1963. The F-statistic for the excluded instrument is around 93, meaning that weak instrument bias is not a concern for our analysis.
9 Carneiro et al. (2011) show substantial population heterogeneity in the impact to college, raising concerns about the external validity of IV estimates of returns to schooling. psychological suitability is assessed; this occurs for the great majority around their 18th birthday. The ability test scores are only available for cohorts born in 1950 or later. Our ability sample therefore consists of 325,233 individuals (with nonmissing test scores) who were born during the period [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] [1954] [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] . This amounts to about 81.3 % of the full sample.
The ability measure is a composite score from three speeded tests -arithmetics, word similarities, and figures.
10 The composite test score is an unweighted mean of the three subtests. The score is reported in stanine (Standard Nine) units, a method of standardizing raw scores into a nine-point standard scale with a normal distribution, a mean of 5, and a standard deviation of 2. We add a full set of test score indicators to equation (6). Our final strategy is to use within-twin-pair estimation of equation (6). This strategy identifies the education premiums by comparing the difference in schooling of the twins in a pair with the difference in their earnings (see e.g. Griliches, 1979; Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994) . The idea is that twins share genetics and the same family background environment, possibly reducing the extent of selection bias.
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Our twins sample consists of 6,490 individuals, which is about 1.1 % of the full sample. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to distinguish between monozygotic and dizygotic twins. This means that our within-twin-pair estimates might be confounded by unobserved heterogeneity in genetics. As we only consider male twin pairs, we know from Weinberg's rule that about half of the males in the twins sample are monozygotic.
Descriptive statistics
Before turning to the estimation of the education premiums, we describe a few important features of our data.
We study the 1943-1963 cohorts during the period 1967-2010. This selection of cohorts provides up to 44 consecutive observations of individual earnings. However, our baseline model estimates age-specific education premiums from age 17 to 62 -a 10 The arithmetic test is quite similar to the arithmetic test in the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) (Cronbach, 1964; Sundet et al., 2005) . The word test is similar to the vocabulary test in WAIS, and the figures test is similar to the Raven Progressive Matrix test (Cronbach, 1964) . See Sundet et al. (2004 Sundet et al. ( , 2005 and Thrane (1977) for details.
11 Although much used, within-twin-pair estimation has been criticized. First, there could be other differences between the twins that are unobservable to the researcher and that affect both the schooling decision and earnings. Second, within-pair estimates will suffer from greater attenuation bias if measurement error is greater for schooling measured in differences than levels. See e.g. Bound and Solon (1999) and Isacsson (2004) for a discussion of attenuation bias in within-twin-pair estimation. We reduce the problem of measurement error by using administrative data on earnings and education attainment rather than self-reported surveys. total of 46 years. As a result, our baseline estimates are based on an unbalanced panel of earnings. For the cohort born in 1949, we observe earnings between the ages of 18 and 62. For the cohorts born earlier (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) , we miss one or more earnings observations between the ages of 17 and 23. For the cohorts born later (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) , earnings are no longer observed at some point over the ages 48-62. , and (iii) the number of observations that are available in estimation after persons who die or out-migrate are dropped (blue shaded area). The sizes of estimation samples thus vary by age both due to the inherently unbalanced structure of our panel data and natural sample attrition due to death and migration. Figure 3 shows the size of each sample by age. Over most of the working lifespan, these samples change little. However, the sample size decreases late (early) in the working lifespan because we are not observing the earnings of younger (older) cohorts at these ages. It is therefore reassuring to find that both the earnings profiles (cf. Figure 1 ) and the education premiums (cf. Figure 4 ) display smooth and concave shapes over the life cycle. Nevertheless, we provide a sensitivity analysis in Section 3.4, showing that our results are robust to restricing the sample to a balanced panel. 17-24, 25-44, 45-62, and 63-85 . In Panels B-D, we provide summary statistics for lifetime measures of earnings and after-tax income (with and without pension entitlements). Panel E reports means and standard deviations for years of schooling. The increase in earnings over the life cycle is accompanied by an increase in the variance of earnings, in line with the fanning out of the income profiles by education levels. We can also see that progressive taxation and pensions considerably attenuate the dispersion in lifetime earnings.
Education premiums and rates of return
Linear earnings-schooling relationship
Figure 4 displays OLS estimates of the education premium in earnings at every age. The estimated effects of schooling increase over most of the life cycle. The estimates start out negative when these men are young, reflecting that some individuals taking higher education are still in school, and that lowly educated workers have considerably more work experience early in their careers. The eduation premiums rise quickly until individuals are in their late 40s. Equipped with education premiums at each age, we compute the corresponding IRR from equation (4). The first column of Table 2 , panel A, reports the IRR estimate with standard errors computed from non-parametric bootstrap.
12 This estimate suggests that a discount rate of 14 percent is necessary to equate the present value of income streams across schooling levels. The other columns of panel A show IRR estimates when addressing the concern for selection bias. In every case, we compute the IRR from a full set of age-specific education premiums. Panel B summarizes how these education premiums vary across the life cycle by estimating the effect of schooling on average earnings in different age intervals. Panel C displays the education premium in lifetime earnings. This columns also reports the impact of schooling on the annuity value of the sum of earnings, discounted by the market interest rates. All estimates in panels B and C are reported in Norwegian Kroner (NOK) adjusted to prices in 2010, while the estimated effect relative to the dependent mean is reported in squared brackets.
There are clear patterns in our results, independent of identification strategy. Additional schooling gives higher lifetime earnings and steeper age-earnings profiles. As a result, the IRR estimates are substantially higher than the market interest rates typically observed. This finding is mirrored in the positive and significant effects of schooling on the annuity lifetime earnings. However, the estimated education premiums in lifetime earnings tend to be higher because most of the earnings gains to schooling arise late in the working life and are discounted heavily in the annuity calculations. For example, the OLS estimates for the full sample imply that an additional year of schooling increases lifetime earnings by 6.3 percent (NOK 18,631), whereas the annuity lifetime earnings increases by 5.2 percent (NOK 9, 266 There are, however, some noticeable differences in the results across the identification strategies. These differences are unlikely to be due to the discrepancies in sample selection, as the OLS estimates are very similar across the samples.
13 In particular, addressing the concern for selection bias decreases the OLS estimates of both the education premiums and the IRR. A common interpretation of this finding is individuals with greater earnings capacity have chosen to acquire more schooling. However, we cannot rule out that these differences are instead due to population heterogeneity in the education premiums. Note: The IRR estimates are calculated using equation (4) 
Accounting for taxes and pension entitlements
Like most studies of the returns to schooling, the estimates in Table 2 are based on pre-tax earnings. Since tuition costs are neligible in Norway, proportional taxes on earnings would have no effect on estimated IRR as they reduce earnings by the same proportion regardless of educational choices (Heckman et al., 1998 (Heckman et al., , 2008 . For the same reason, ignoring earnings-related pension entitlement would not affect the IRR estimates if pension income was proportional to lifetime earnings. However, the progressive nature of the Norwegian tax and pension system may attenuate the incentives to invest in education. Note: The IRR estimates are calculated using equation (4) and regression estimates of age-specific education earnings premiums βt in equation (6). All earnings regressions include childhood municipality fixed effects and cohort dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are based on 250 bootstrap replications (for both stages)
clustered at the municipality level. Information on taxes and pension rules is collected from SSB (1975, 1988, 1994) , Skatteetaten (2010) and NAV (2013) . See Appendix A.1 for variable definitions and sample restrictions employed in each estimation. * p < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In the first and second row of Table 3 , we report IRR estimates based on pre-tax and after-tax earnings, respectively. As in most OECD countries, the tax system in Norway is progressive through deductions and surtaxes.
14 Comparing the estimates, we find that accounting for income taxation reduces the IRR estimates by around 10-15 percent. To understand how taxes affect the incentives to invest in education, we present OLS estimates of the education premium in after-tax earnings over the life cycle in Figure 5 . 15 We can see that progressive taxes not only reduces the education premium in lifetime income but also the slope of the age-specific education premiums. In particular, progressive taxes induce a greater decline in education premiums at later stages of the life-cycle compared to the decline induced in foregone earnings at early ages.
In the third row of Table 3 , we further report IRR estimates based on after-tax earnings inclusive of after-tax pension entitlements. Comparing the estimates, we find that IRR estimates barely move when we account for pensions, irrespective of the identification strategy we employ. These estimates are consistent with a compressed distribution of old-age pension incomes in Norway, due to the relatively high levels of minimum entitlements. Education premiums in pension incomes moreover enter equation (4) only at later stages of the life cycle, and are thus discounted heavily when calculating IRR. We therefore expect pensions to induce relatively small responses in IRRs compared to changes in premiums at earlier stages of the life cycle. Table 4 provide further results from a non-linear specification that allows us to construct IRR estimates that vary by the length of schooling. Specifically, we replace the linear specification (6) by the following spline specification
Nonlinear earnings-schooling relationship
where I(S ≥ j) is an indicator function equal to 1 if years of schooling S ≥ j for 16 We aslo report estimates of education premiums in lifetime earnings inclusive of pension entitlements in the Appendix, Table A.4, Panel C. We find that the OLS estimate of mean lifetime education premium reduces to 3.9 % once we account for pensions. j = (7, 11, 14, 18) .
17 Unfortunately, we do not have access to multiple instruments to construct non-linear IV estimates. This restricts our comparison of linear and non-linear estimates to OLS, IQ-control and within-twin strategies. Note: The non-linear IRR estimates are calculated using equation (4) The IRR estimates reflect some non-linearities by length of schooling around the baseline linear estimate at 0.14. The OLS estimates in column (1) show an IRR at 0.13 for taking an additional year of schooling before completing 10 years of schooling (corresponding to primary education). The IRR increases to 0.149 between 11 and 14 years of schooling (corresponding to high school), before again declines to 0.127-0.128 between 15 and 21 years of schooling (corresponding to college/university education). Controlling for IQ test scores and employing twins fixed effects in columns (2)-(3), 17 Thus, we specify earnings as a piece-wise linear spline function of years of schooling over four intervals {7-10, 11-14, 15-17, 18-21} each with a different slope β j t (schooling vary between 7 and 21 years in our data). Based on this specification, we can calculate earnings premiums for having an additional year of schooling simply as equal to β 7 t up to 10 years of schooling, β (4) we can moreover compute the IRRs at each of the four segments.
we again find a similar pattern with the highest IRR estimates during high school education and lower returns both before and after completed high school. Overall, our findings suggest that the linear specification provides a relatively good approximation of a possibly underlying non-linear relationship.
Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we test the sensivity of our estimates along two dimensions: First, we present results from a series of robustness checks for the instrumental variables strategy we employ. Second, we test the sensitivty of our estimates to the unbalanced structure of our panel data.
Robustness of IV estimates
An important requirement for the IV strategy discussed in Section 2.3 to be valid is that the implementation of compulsory schooling reform is exogenous conditional on both childhood municipality fixed effects and bith cohort dummies, and thus unrelated to different underlying cohort trends in earnings and educational attainment across municipalities. To assess the validity of this assumption, we provide here results from a series of tests.
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First, we investigate the relationship between the timing of schooling reform and baseline municipality characteristics. To this end, we estimate an equation for the timing of reform on a large number of socio-economic and demographic variables, such as education attainment, mean and variance of household income, work force participation, unemployment rate, share of welfare recipients, population size and density, voter turnout, political affiliation, etc., that are all measured at the municipality-level in the baseline year of 1960, and further interacted with time dummies (see equation (A.1) in the Appendix). Figure A. 2 plots the coefficient estimates of the interacted time dummy for this estimation. Consistent with our IV strategy, we find that there is no systematic relationship between the timing of the implementation of the schooling reform and baseline municipality characteristics, once we control for municipality-specific fixed effects and a secular trend in reform implementation over time.
Second, to further increase confidence in our IV estimates, we check the robustness of our IV estimates to inclusion of differential municipality-specific cohort trends using data on earnings and educational attainment for cohorts 1930-1960 over the pre-reform period (see Table A .5). We reports results from these specification checks in Table 5 , columns (2)-(3), with estimates quite close to our baseline estimates.
Moreover, following Duflo (2001) we also include interactions of each of the baseline covariates with secular linear or quadratic cohort trends. In doing so, we allow the reform implementation to be related to different underlying cohort trends in earnings and educational attainment across municipalities, depending on their pre-reform characteristics. Columns (4) and (5) in Table 5 report the estimates based on these specifications. Again we find that these estimates are close to our baseline estimates; if anything, the robustness check of interacting the covariates with cohort trends adds to the precision of our IV estimates. Note: The IRR estimates are calculated using equation (4) and regression estimates of age-specific education earnings premiums βt in equation (6). All earnings regressions include childhood municipality fixed effects and cohort dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are based on 250 bootstrap replications (for both stages) clustered at the municipality level. Columns (2)-(3) include linear and quadratic municipality specific cohort trends constructed using data on lifetime earnings and educational attainment for pre-reform or non-treated individuals among cohorts 1930-1960 (see Table A Finally, we have also performed two placebo tests based on our baseline reduced form specification. The first replaces the year of reform by 14 years before the actual year of reform within each municipality, and uses data on earnings for the pre-reform cohorts 1930-1945 to estimate the reduced form specification. In doing so, this pre-reform placebo test places the reform implementation in the period before the actual reform took place. Since cohorts 1930-1945 did not experience a compulsory schooling reform, significant estimates would suggest that the reform implementation is correlated with pre-reform trends in earnings. Table A.7, column (2), reports the results for this placebo test. It is reassuring to find no evidence of a significant correlation between the reform implementation and the pre-reform trends in earnings.
The second placebo test examines whether the reform implementation is correlated with post-reform municipality-specific trends in earnings. In particular, we replace the year of reform by 14 years after the actual year of reform within each municipality, and use data on earnings for the post-reform cohorts 1961-1975 to estimate our reduced form specification. Since all cohorts 1961-1975 experienced the compulsory schooling reform equally, significant estimates would suggest that the reform implementation is correlated with differential post-reform trends in earnings. Table A .7, column (3), reports the results for this placebo test. It is again reassuring to find no evidence of a significant correlation between the reform implementation and the post-reform trends in earnings.
Sensitivity to unbalanced panel Our baseline estimates in Sections 3.1 -3.2 are based on an unbalanced panel of earnings. There are two reasons for having an unbalanced panel (cf. Figure 3) : First, we follow 1943-1963 cohorts over years 1967-2010. This selection of cohorts provides up to 44 consecutive observations of individual earnings, while our baseline model estimates age-specific education premiums from age 17 to 62 -a total of 46 years. As a result, our selection of cohorts and time periods for measuring life cycle income histories implies an unbalanced panel of earnings. Second, we do not observe incomes over all ages 17-62 for individuals who die or out-migrate before age 62.
19 The sizes of estimation samples thus vary by age either due to our selection of cohorts or natural sample attrition due to death and migration. 20 To assess the sensitivity of our estimates to having an unbalanced panel, we provide in Table 6 results from a series of tests. First, we present estimates from a balanced panel of earnings for cohorts 1950-1960 in the second row of Table 6 . For this balanced sample, we can use education premiums in annual earnings only over ages 17-50 in the calculation of IRRs and lifetime education premiums. We find small differences in the IRR estimates when we restrict our analysis to the balanced panel.
19 As depicted in Figure 3 , nature sample attrition due to death or out-migration becomes more severe as we follow individuals over the life-cycle. For instance, less than 3.9 % among the full sample had died by age 47, while about 11.9 % among cohorts 1943-1948 (which could be followed through age 62) had died by age 62. Similarly, only about 1.3 % among the full sample had migrated by age 47 and about 1.7 % among cohorts 1943-1948 had migrated by age 62. Thus, we loose earnings data for at most about 13.6 % of the full sample at age 62 due to either death or migration.
20 Meanwhile, being register-based our sample does not suffer from attrition due to selective non-response, which could be a serious concern in analyses based on longitudinal surveys. clustered at the municipality level. Information on taxes and pension rules is collected from SSB (1975, 1988, 1994) , Second, we provide results from two tests for the effects of natural sample attrition in the third and fourth rows of Table 6 . For constructing the estimates presented in the third row, we retained individuals that were earlier dropped due to death or out-migration in our baseline estimation by assigning earnings equal to 0 at ages with missing earnings. While for the estimates presented in the fourth row, we instead retained these observations by assigning missing earnings equal to the individual's average earnings over the past 5 years prior to death or migration. We again find small differences across the baseline IRR estimates in the first row and the estimates in the third-fourth rows.
Comparison to estimates from standard approaches
Using an exceptionally long panel with life cycle earnings histories for actual cohorts, we provided in Section 3 estimates of the IRR to schooling that relax many of the strong assumptions typical in the literature using cross-sectional data. Heckman et al. (2006) discuss two alternative approaches for estimating the IRR based on crosssectional data. Following Mincer (1974) , the most common approach in empirical studies is to specify cross-sectional earnings as a multiplicatively separable function of schooling and experience. Importantly, the schooling coefficient in a Mincer regression of log-earnings can be interepreted as an IRR under the assumptions of a stationary environment and multiplicative separability of the earnings-schooling-experience relationship.
21 Heckman et al. (2006) also discuss an alternative more-flexible approach for estimating the IRR based on a cross-section that does not require multiplicative separability of the earnings-schooling-experience relationship. Specifically, they estimate more general specifications the earnings-schooling relationship on cross-sectional data, predict life cycle earnings profiles based on cross-sectional estimates, and construct IRR estimates based on predicted life cycle earnings under the assumption a stationary environment. In constrast, our analysis exploits a long panel with life cycle earnings histories for actual cohorts to identify IRR estimates without the need to assume stationarity or multiplicative separability of the earnings-schooling-experience relationship.
To compare our cohort-based IRR estimates with standard cross-sectional approaches, we plot in Figure 6 (a) estimates of IRRs over years 1980-2010 based on a range of approaches. First, we plot the so-called Mincer coefficients, which were estimated as the schooling coefficients in cross-sectional regressions (1) of log-earnings. Next, we plot IRR estimates based an alternative more-flexible approach using cross-sectional data to construct a life cycle education-earnings profile under the stationarity assumption. Specifically, we estimate education premiums β t at each age t in each cross-section and construct IRRs based on equation (4) and estimates of β t in each cross-section. For both of these approaches, we use annual earnings for Norwegian males aged 17-62 in each cross-section. For further comparision, we also present the Mincer coefficients estimated using data for only cohorts 1943-1963 in each cross-section. Finally, we add a horizontal line at 0.14 depicting our baseline cohort-based IRR estimate calculated using data on life cycle earnings histories for cohorts in Section 3.1.
The estimates reflect substantial heterogeneity in the returns profiles over time and across estimation approaches. The Mincer coefficients are substantially lower than the corresponding cross-sectional IRR estimates in each cross-section. This indicates that the Mincer log-earnings-schooling-experience relationship remains misspecified for our data. This is also found to be the case when we restrict the Mincer estimation to cohorts 1943-1963 in each cross-section. We moreover find that the cross-sectional IRR estimates based on the more flexible approach vary dramatically over time; moving from 0.075 in 1980 to 0.22 in 2010. The cross-sectional IRRs generally do not equate the baseline cohort-based IRR estimate at 0.14, except in 1990. This finding further suggests that the assumption of a stationary age-earnings education profile over time is highly questionable. Overall, our findings suggest that the cross-sectional IRRs and Mincer coefficients are unlikely to approximate the IRR for actual cohorts and estimates based on cross-section approaches should be interpreted with caution. To further investigate the driving forces behind the dramatic changes in crosssectional IRRs over time, we plot the relative changes in foregone earnings over ages 17-24 and education earnings premiums over ages 25-62 for years 1980-2010 in Figure  6 (b). The relative changes depict the percent difference in education premiums over ages 17-24 and 25-62, respectively, in every year relative to 1990 -the year when the cohort-based and the cross-sectional IRR equate. The figure shows that underlying the substantial increase in cross-sectional IRRs are both a substantial decline in costs of an additional year of schooling, measured as foregone earnings over ages 17-24, and a remarkable increase in post-schooling education earnings premiums, measured as average education premiums over ages 25-62. This suggests that the changes in cross-sectional IRRs over years 1980-2010 reflect substantial changes to the age-specific education premiums over time, both with respect to costs and benefits of an additional year of schooling. These findings provide further evidence against stationarity of age-earnings education profile over time, with costs and benefits of schooling moving in opposite directions. Note: For details on the cohort-based estimates, see note to Table 2 (4), where we use age-specific education premiums βt estimated separately for each age 17-62. Data from 2005 are used to ensure support over the age distribution, as this is required for calculating the cross-sectional IRR estimates using equation (4). In particular, as the IQ sample consists of Norwegian males born in 1950 or later only, we can't observe earnings for the IQ sample at later ages in earlier cross-sections. Our IV strategy uses both geographic and cohort variation in exposure to the schooling reform among cohorts 1943-1963. This implies limited support over the age distribution for the IV sample in each cross-section, and does not allow us to estimate age-specific education premiums and calculate cross-sectional IRRs.
* p < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In Table 7 we provide cross-sectional estimates that take into account the endogeneity of schooling. For this analysis, we use data on annual earnings for Norwegian males over ages 17-62 in year 2005.
22 The Mincer coefficients estimated based on equation (1) are presented in Panel B. As before, we present the Mincer coefficients 22 We employ cross-sectional data from 2005 to ensure sufficient support over the age distribution, as this is required for calculating the cross-sectional IRR estimates using equation (4). In particular, estimated both using a complete sample over ages 17-62 in 2005 and a sample restricted to cohorts . Next, we present the cross-sectional IRRs based on the more-flexible approach in Panel C. We again find that the cross-sectional estimates fail to match the IRR estimates for actual cohorts, even after controlling for the endogeneity of schooling. These findings further highlight that cross-sectional estimates should be interpreted with caution and echo the conclusion by Heckman et al. (2006) that a cohort-based analysis is likely to provide more reliable IRR estimates measured over a life cycle.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to provide a detailed picture of the causal relationship between schooling and earnings over the life cycle, following individuals across their working lifespan. We adressed a number of key questions: What do the education premiums look like over the life cycle? What is the impact of schooling on lifetime earnings? How does the IRR compare with the market interest rates typically observed? To what extent does progressive taxes attenuate the rates of return to schooling? To investigate these important questions, we exploited a unique source of population panel data containing records for every Norwegian male from 1967 to 2010. To account for endogeneity of schooling, we applied three identification strategies that are currently in use in the literature: (i) compulsory schooling reform as an instrument for schooling, (ii) controls for ability test scores, and (iii) within-twin-pair estimation. The analysis was explicitly ex post and focused on identifying the actual returns earned by certain cohorts over their life cycle.
We started our analysis by estimating education premiums at each age. The findings revealed that additional schooling gives higher lifetime earnings and steeper age-earnings profile, in line with predictions from human capital theory. The agespecific education premiums implied an IRR of around 10 percent, after taking into account income taxes, earnings-related pension entitlements and tuition costs. Under standard conditions, this finding suggests it was financially profitable to take additional schooling because the rate of return is substantially higher than the market interest rates typically observed. By comparison, estimates from the Mincer model substantially understated the IRR, because of nonstationarity and misspecification since the IQ sample consists of Norwegian males born in 1950 or later only, we don't observe earnings for the IQ sample at later ages in the earlier cross-sections. Our IV strategy uses both geographic and cohort variation in exposure to the schooling reform among cohorts 1943-1963, implying a limited support over the age distribution in each cross-section which does not allow us to estimate age-specific education premiums and cross-sectional IRRs. This restricts our comparison of cohort-based and cross-sectional IRRs across OLS, IQ-control and within-twin-pair estimates.
of the earnings-schooling-experience relationship.
Our approach has relaxed many of the strong assumptions that are typical in the literature using cross-sectional data. Importantly, we estimated education premiums and IRRs of actual cohorts without assuming multiplicative separability between schooling and experience or a stationarity environment. The size and detailed nature of the data we used allowed us to explore nonlinearities in the earnings-schooling relationship. Unlike most of the literature, our estimated rates of return take into account income taxation and earnings-related pension entitlements. While there is little if any pecuniary cost of schooling (such as tuition or fees) in Norway, our analysis abstracted from any psychic costs of education. Psychic costs could help explaining why not more individuals take additional schooling despite its high estimated financial return (see e.g. Carneiro et al., 2003; Cunha et al., 2005) . Alternative explanations include credit market constraints (see e.g. Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; Belley and Lochner, 2007) or uncertainy about educational costs and future earnings (see e.g. Cunha et al., 2005; Heckman et al., 2006) .
Our analytic sample is restricted to Norwegian males born to ensure that we use a sufficiently long span over the life-cycle for measuring lifetime incomes. We exclude immigrants as well as individuals with missing information on years of schooling and childhood municipality of residence. Table A .2 shows the importance of each selection restriction across cohorts. Applying these restrictions provided us with what we will refer to as the full sample, consisting of 600,679 individuals. [1943] [1944] [1945] [1946] [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] [1954] [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] . Information on childhood municipality is needed in our analysis to condition on childhood municipality characteristics and also correctly identify treatment status in the IV analysis.
In Table A .3, we show the sizes of each estimation samples by cohort and identification strategy after the sample selections were made. For the IV strategy, we require information on the timing of compulsory schooling reform to identify the treatment status. This information is available for 672 out of total 732 municipalities existing in 1960. We can thus allocate reform dummies to nearly 96 % of persons in the full sample. For the IQ strategy, we require information on IQ test scores. That information is only available for cohorts born in 1950 or later. Our IQ sample therefore consists of 325,233 observations with non-missing IQ test scores, that is 81.2 % of the full sample males born in 1950 or later. For the Twins strategy, we use only same-sex twins (both males) with non-missing information. Our twins sample consists of 6,490 individuals, that is 1.1 % of the full sample. with non-missing information on education and childhood municipality.
A.2 The Norwegian tax and pension systems
As in most OECD countries, the Norwegian tax system is progressive through deductions and surtaxes. Important features of the Norwegian tax system include a basic flat tax rate of 28 % on labor income, a series of progressively increasing surtaxes at different income brackets, a basic income tax deduction that further increases the progressivity, and finally, a social security contribution tax on labor income. While the basic structure of the Norwegian tax system has remained unchanged over the past decades, there have been considerable changes in both the surtax rates, tax brackets, and deductions over time. Moreover, the Norwegian tax system has become less progressive through a series of policy reforms over the recent decades. These features provide considerable variation in both average and marginal tax rates over time, as illustrated in Figure Note: Panels (a) and (b) plot marginal and average rates, respectively, for single wage earners and couples that are not subject to joint taxation. We take into account progressivity of taxes and basic deducations for labor income, but disregard taxes on wealth assets, deductions for single parents and commuters and other irregular regional deductions. Information on tax rules over time is collected from SSB (1975, 1988, 1994) and Skatteetaten (2010) .
In accordance with the Norwegian National Insurance Act (Folketrygdloven), all Norwegians are entitled to public pension upon retirement. The pension amount depends on an individual's earnings history from age 16 to retirement. Although the mandatory retirement age is 67, about 80 % of Norwegian workers are entitled to receive early retirement benefits beginning at age 62 (Hernaes et al., 2013) . We compute individual pension entitlements and after-tax pensions based on the rules introduced following a pension reform in 2010, which most of the cohorts born 1943-1963 used in our analysis are subject to. Further detailes on the current pension system can be found in AID (2009) and NAV (2013) and on the pension tax rates in SSB (1975 SSB ( , 1988 SSB ( , 1994 and Skatteetaten (2010) . Tables A.4 reports education premiums in lifetime earnings that account for taxes and pensions. Note: All regressions include childhood municipality fixed effects and cohort dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are based on 250 bootstrap replications (for both stages) clustered at the municipality level.
All parameter estimates are reported in Norwegian Kroner in 2010 prices, with estimates scaled relative to the dependent mean reported in squared brackets. Information on taxes and pension rules is collected from SSB (1975, 1988, 1994) , AID (2009), Skatteetaten (2010) and NAV (2013) . See Section A.1 for variable definitions and sample restrictions employed in each estimation. * p < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A.3 The Norwegian compulsory schooling reform
Our IV identification strategy follows Black et al. (2005) , Monstad et al. (2008) , Aakvik et al. (2010) and Machin et al. (2012) in using the staged implementation of a Norwegian compulsory schooling law reform as a source to exogenous variation in schooling. We provide here a more detailed description of the institutional setting for the Norwegian reform, assess exogeneity of the timing of reform implementation and present results from a range of robustness checks of our IV strategy.
Reform implementation The Norwegian compulsory schooling reform is similar to many reforms carried out in European countries over the latter half of the 20th century. 23 The reform increased compulsory schooling from seven to nine years, and was implemented between 1959 and 1974 in different municipalities (the lowest level of local administration) at different times, affecting cohorts born 1946-1961. Thus, for more than a decade, Norwegian schools were divided into two separate systems, where the years of compulsory schooling depended on the year that an individual was born and the municipality of residence. The reform started originally as a designed experiment in six municipalities chosen by the Ministry of Education, until it was made compulsory by the central government. Once the legislation was passed in 1959, the municipalities were required to implement the reform by the end of 1972, but were given the liberty to decide the exact timing by themselves. To implement the reform, municipalities were required to present a plan to the central government regarding needs for new teachers, buildings, and other costs. The plan was approved by a selection committee at the central level. Thus the final timing of the reform across municipalities was partly determined by a bureaucratic process. The central government supported the reform financially, for instance by covering the complete costs of new schools, consistent with the idea that the reform should reduce geographical disparities in educational availability.
Largely based on earlier studies by Ness (1971) , Lie (1973) , Black et al. (2005) and Aakvik et al. (2010) , we are able to successfully identify the year in which the reform was implemented for as many as 672 out of the 732 municipalities that existed in 1960. For the remaining municipalities the reform was either staged over several years or it is unclear when the reform took place. In line with the aforementioned papers, we drop individuals who were residing in a municipality to which we could not assign a reform indicator. Applying this sample restriction we get an IV sample consisting of 576,512 individuals, which is nearly 96 % of the Full sample. Table A .5 displays the number of individuals exposed to the compulsory schooling reform across cohorts . There is considerable variation in exposure to the compulsory schooling reform, both across cohorts and municipalities. In particular, no individuals born before 1946 were subject to nine years of compulsory schooling, whereas all those born in 1961 or later were required to have nine years of compulsory schooling. To this end, we estimate the following equation
where T kp is an indicator for the timing of reform, equal to 1 if municipality m implements reform in year p and 0 otherwise, and B m,1960 is a vector that includes municipality-level information from the baseline year of 1960 on a large number socio-economic and demographic variables, such as education attainment, mean and variance of household income, work force participation, unemployment rate, share of welfare recipients, population size and density, voter turnout, political affiliation, etc, which is multiplied by a vector of time dummies Γ p . The municipality-specific fixed effects τ m capture time-invariant correlates of the timing of reform, whereas time dummies τ p capture secular trends in reform implementation over time. Figure A .2 plots the estimated coefficients from the vector ψ p for each year p (and the associated 95 % confidence intervals), showing the effects of baseline observable municipality characteristics on the timing of reform implementation. Consistent with our IV strategy, controlling for municipality-specific fixed effects and time dummies, we find that there is no systematic relationship between the timing of the implementation of the schooling reform and baseline municipality characteristics.
Robustness analysis An important requirement for our IV approach to be valid is that the reform implementation is unrelated to different underlying cohort trends in earnings and educational attainment across municipalities.
As a first check for this possibility we estimate municipality-specific cohort trends using data on earnings and educational attainment for cohorts 1930 -1960 over the pre-reform period (see Table A In doing so, we allow the reform implementation to be related to different underlying cohort trends in earnings and educational attainment across municipalities, depending on their pre-reform characteristics. Table 5 . We have also performed two placebo tests based on our baseline reduced form specification. The first replaces the year of reform by 14 years before the actual year of reform within each municipality, and uses data on earnings for the pre-reform cohorts [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] to estimate the reduced form specification. In doing so, this pre-reform placebo test places the reform implementation in the period before the actual reform took place. Since cohorts 1930-1945 did not experience a compulsory schooling reform, significant estimates would suggest that the reform implementation is correlated with pre-reform trends in earnings. Table A .7, column (2) , reports the results for this placebo test. Note: See note to Table A.6. In column (2), we move the year of reform within each municipality by taking time of reform -14, and regress each outcome variable on the new placebo reform dummy using data on earnings from years 1967-2010 for the pre-reform cohorts [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] . In column (3), we move the year of reform within each municipality by taking year of refom + 14, and regress each outcome variable on the new placebo reform dummy using data on earnings from years 1967-2010 for the post-reform cohorts [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] . We can follow the post-reform cohorts at most until age 49 using data from 1967-2010.
The second placebo test examines whether the reform implementation is correlated with post-reform municipality-specific trends in earnings. In particular, we replace the year of reform by 14 years after the actual year of reform within each municipality, and uses data on earnings for the post-reform cohorts 1961-1975 to estimate our reduced form specification. Since all cohorts 1961-1975 experienced the compulsory schooling reform equally, significant estimates would suggest that the reform implementation is correlated with post-reform trends in earnings. Table A .7, column (3) , reports the results for this second placebo test.
